



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I**  
2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100  
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-2713

June 25, 2013

Mr. Michael J. Pacilio  
Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC  
President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear  
4300 Winfield Road  
Warrenville, IL 60555

**SUBJECT: PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 – NUCLEAR  
REGULATORY COMMISSION PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION  
INSPECTION REPORT 05000277/2013008 AND 05000278/2013008**

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

On May 23, 2013, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on May 23, 2013, with Mr. Patrick Navin, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification and resolution of problems and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the samples selected for review, the inspectors did not identify any findings during this inspection. The inspectors concluded that Exelon was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. Exelon personnel identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. Exelon, in general, prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the problems and corrective actions were implemented in a timely manner. Lessons learned from industry operating experience were effectively reviewed and applied when appropriate. Additionally, the inspectors concluded that self-assessments and audits reviewed during the inspection were critical, thorough, and effective in identifying issues.

In accordance with Title 10 *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records

M. Pacilio

2

(PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

**/RA/**

Mel Gray, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 4  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-277, 50-278  
License Nos. DPR-44, DPR-56

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000277/2013008 and 05000278/2013008  
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

(PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

**/RA/**

Mel Gray, Chief  
 Reactor Projects Branch 4  
 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-277, 50-278  
 License Nos. DPR-44, DPR-56

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000277/2013008 and 05000278/2013008  
 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

Distribution w/encl: (via email)

- |                      |                               |
|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| W. Dean, RA          | A. Turilin, DRP               |
| D. Lew, DRA          | B. Lin, DRP                   |
| D. Roberts, DRP      | S. Hansell, DRP, SRI          |
| A. Burritt, DRP      | A. Ziedonis, DRP, RI          |
| C. Miller, DRS       | S. Schmitt, DRP, OA           |
| J. Clifford, DRS     | T. Setzer, DRP                |
| V. Campbell, RI OEDO | C. Bickett, DRP               |
| M. Gray, DRP         | G. Smith, DRS                 |
| R. Powell, DRP       | RidsNrrPMPeachBottom Resource |
| S. Barber, DRP       | RidsNrrDorLpl1-2 Resource     |
| J. Ayala, DRP        | ROPreports Resource           |

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH TSAB\Inspection Reports\PBAPS PI&R 2013\PB PIR Report 2013.docx  
 ADAMS Accession No.: **ML13176A401**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SUNSI Review		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Non-Sensitive <input type="checkbox"/> Sensitive		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Publicly Available <input type="checkbox"/> Non-Publicly Available	
OFFICE	RI/DRP	RI/DRP	RI/DRP		
NAME	TSetzer/TCS	RPowell/RP	MGray/MG		
DATE	06/17/13	06/17/13	06/24/13		

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION I

Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278

License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56

Report Nos. 05000277/2013008 and 05000278/2013008

Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3

Location: Delta, PA

Dates: May 6, 2013 through May 23, 2013

Team Leader: Thomas Setzer, Senior Project Engineer

Inspectors: Carey Bickett, Senior Project Engineer  
George Smith, Physical Security Inspector  
Adam Ziedonis, Peach Bottom Resident Inspector

Approved by: Mel Gray, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 4  
Division of Reactor Projects

## SUMMARY

IR 05000277/2013008 and 05000278/2013008; 05/06/13 – 05/23/13; Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3; Biennial Baseline Inspection of Problem Identification and Resolution.

This NRC team inspection was performed by three regional inspectors and one resident inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

### Problem Identification and Resolution

The inspectors concluded that Exelon was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. Exelon personnel identified problems, entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold, and in general, prioritized issues commensurate with their safety significance. Exelon appropriately screened issues for operability and reportability, and performed causal analyses that appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also determined that Exelon implemented corrective actions to address the problems identified in the corrective action program in a timely manner.

The inspectors concluded that Exelon adequately identified, reviewed, and applied relevant industry operating experience to Peach Bottom operations. In addition, based on those items selected for review, the inspectors determined that Exelon's self-assessments and audits were thorough.

Based on the interviews the inspectors conducted over the course of the inspection, observations of plant activities, and reviews of individual corrective action program and employee concerns program issues, the inspectors did not identify any indications that site personnel were unwilling to raise safety issues, nor did they identify any conditions that could have had a negative impact on the site's safety conscious work environment.

No findings were identified.

## REPORT DETAILS

### 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

#### 4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152B)

This inspection constitutes one biennial sample of problem identification and resolution as defined by Inspection Procedure 71152. All documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

#### .1 Assessment of Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the procedures that described Exelon's corrective action program at Peach Bottom. To assess the effectiveness of the corrective action program, the inspectors reviewed performance in three primary areas: problem identification, prioritization and evaluation of issues, and corrective action implementation. The inspectors compared performance in these areas to the requirements and standards contained in Title 10 *Code of Federal Regulations* 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," and Exelon procedure LS-AA-125, "Corrective Action Program Procedure." For each of these areas, the inspectors considered risk insights from the station's risk analysis and reviewed condition reports selected across the seven cornerstones of safety in the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process. Additionally, the inspectors attended multiple Plan-of-the-Day, Station Ownership Committee, and Management Review Committee meetings. The inspectors selected items from the following functional areas for review: engineering, operations, maintenance, emergency preparedness, radiation protection, chemistry, physical security, and radiation protection.

##### (1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification

In addition to the items described above, the inspectors reviewed system health reports, a sample of completed corrective and preventative maintenance work orders, completed surveillance test procedures and periodic trend reports. The inspectors also completed field walkdowns of various systems on site, such as the emergency diesel generators, high pressure coolant injection, reactor core isolation cooling, core spray, residual heat removal, 125 Vdc batteries, and 4kV equipment rooms. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports written to document issues identified through internal self-assessments, audits, and the operating experience program. The inspectors completed this review to verify that Exelon entered conditions adverse to quality into their corrective action program as appropriate.

##### (2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and prioritization of a sample of condition reports issued since the last NRC biennial Problem Identification and Resolution inspection completed in August 2011. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports that were assigned lower levels of significance that did not include formal cause evaluations to ensure that they were properly classified. The inspectors' review included the

appropriateness of the assigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness of resolution. The inspectors assessed whether the evaluations identified likely causes for the issues and developed appropriate corrective actions to address the identified causes. Further, the inspectors reviewed equipment operability determinations, reportability assessments, and extent-of-condition reviews for selected problems to verify these processes adequately addressed equipment operability, reporting of issues to the NRC, and the extent of the issues.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The inspectors reviewed Exelon's completed corrective actions through documentation review and, in some cases, field walkdowns to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports for adverse trends and repetitive problems to determine whether corrective actions were effective in addressing the broader issues. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's timeliness in implementing corrective actions and effectiveness in precluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with selected non-cited violations and findings to verify that Exelon personnel properly evaluated and resolved these issues. In addition, the inspectors expanded the corrective action review to five years to evaluate Exelon actions related to average power range monitors and conditions associated with reactor half-scam signals.

b. Assessment

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification

Based on the selected samples, plant walkdowns, and interviews of site personnel in multiple functional areas, the inspectors determined that Exelon identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. Exelon staff at Peach Bottom initiated approximately 32,000 condition reports between August 2011 and May 2013. The inspectors observed supervisors at the Plan-of-the-Day, Station Ownership Committee, and Management Review Committee meetings appropriately questioning and challenging condition reports to ensure clarification of the issues. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that Exelon trended equipment and programmatic issues, and appropriately identified problems in condition reports. Additionally, inspectors concluded that personnel were identifying trends at low levels. In general, inspectors did not identify any issues or concerns that had not been appropriately entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. In response to several questions and minor equipment observations identified by the inspectors during plant walkdowns, Exelon personnel promptly initiated condition reports and took immediate action to address the issues.

(2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

The inspectors determined that, in general, Exelon appropriately prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. Exelon screened condition reports for operability and reportability, categorized the condition reports by significance, and assigned actions to the appropriate department for evaluation and resolution. The condition report screening process considered human

performance issues, radiological safety concerns, repetitiveness, adverse trends, and potential impact on the safety conscious work environment.

Based on the sample of condition reports reviewed, the inspectors noted that the guidance provided by Exelon corrective action program implementing procedures appeared sufficient to ensure consistency in categorization of issues. Operability and reportability determinations were performed when conditions warranted and the evaluations supported the conclusion. Causal analyses appropriately considered the extent of condition or problem, generic issues, and previous occurrences of the issue. However, the inspectors noted the following observation in Exelon's prioritization of condition reports.

Exelon generated condition reports 1396023 and 1272124 to document Maintenance Rule concerns with the 480V and core spray systems, respectively. Included in these condition reports were actions to perform a Maintenance Rule paragraph a(1) determination to evaluate each system's Maintenance rule classification. The station assigned a significance level of 4 to both of these condition reports. Exelon procedure LS-AA-120, Attachment 2, "Issue Report Level and Class Criteria," provides examples to be considered when assigning a condition report significance level. LS-AA-120 defines a potential Maintenance Rule a(1) condition as a significance level 3 condition report. The inspectors determined that assigning a level 4 to condition reports 1396023 and 1272124 did not meet the guidance described in LS-AA-120, and therefore, was a performance deficiency. However, because these issues were isolated cases and did not indicate a programmatic weakness to properly prioritize condition reports, the inspectors determined that the issue was of minor significance and not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy. Exelon documented this issue in condition report 1513303.

### (3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were, in general, timely and adequately implemented. For significant conditions adverse to quality, Exelon, in general, identified actions to prevent recurrence. The inspectors concluded that corrective actions to address the sample of NRC non-cited violations and findings since the last problem identification and resolution inspection were timely and effective. However, the inspectors noted the following observation associated with prompt corrective action.

The inspectors reviewed root cause evaluation 938245 and determined that Exelon did not take prompt corrective action for a condition adverse to quality. Since 2009, Exelon has experienced multiple steam leak detection instrument power supply failures due to grounds that have affected the 125Vdc system. Exelon staff developed a corrective action to prevent recurrence (CAPR) to revise design specifications for the steam leak detection system power supplies to include adequate voltage surge suppression capability for equipment connected to the direct current system. The CAPR, however, did not require replacement of the power supplies currently installed in the plant under the previous design specification. Since power supply failures have continued to occur since the CAPR was completed, the inspectors determined that not promptly correcting the steam leak detection system power supply failures was a performance deficiency. The inspectors screened the issue in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening," and IMC Appendix E, "Examples of Minor



Issues,” and determined the issue was similar to the minor example in example 4d. The inspectors determined the issue was of minor significance and not subject to enforcement action because the failure of Exelon’s CAPR to promptly correct power supplies problems did not impact safety. The main steam leak detection system is designed with redundant power supplies, therefore a single power supply failure has no safety impact, and multiple, concurrent failures would be required to generate a single channel containment isolation valve trip signal. Exelon entered this issue into the corrective action program in condition report 1522740.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with review of industry operating experience to determine whether Exelon personnel appropriately evaluated the operating experience information for applicability to Peach Bottom and had taken appropriate actions, when warranted. The inspectors also reviewed evaluations of operating experience documents associated with a sample of NRC generic communications to ensure that Exelon personnel adequately considered the underlying problems associated with the issues for resolution via their corrective action program. In addition, the inspectors observed various plant activities to determine if the station considered industry operating experience during the performance of routine and infrequently performed activities.

b. Assessment

The inspectors determined that Exelon appropriately considered industry operating experience information for applicability, and used the information for corrective and preventive actions to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. The inspectors determined that operating experience was appropriately applied and lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations and procedures when applicable. The inspectors also observed that industry operating experience was routinely discussed and considered during the conduct of Station Ownership Committee and Management Review Committee meetings.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of audits, including the most recent audit of the corrective action program, focused area self-assessments, and check-in self-assessments performed by Exelon. Inspectors performed these reviews to determine if Exelon entered problems identified through these assessments into the corrective action

program, when appropriate, and whether Exelon initiated corrective actions to address identified deficiencies. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the audits and assessments by comparing audit and assessment results against self-revealing and NRC-identified observations made during the inspection.

b. Assessment

The inspectors concluded that focused area self-assessments, check-in self-assessments, and audits were critical, thorough, and effective in identifying issues. The inspectors observed that Exelon personnel knowledgeable in the subject completed these audits and self-assessments in a methodical manner. Exelon staff completed these audits and self-assessments to a sufficient depth to identify issues which were then entered into the corrective action program for evaluation. The station implemented corrective actions associated with the identified issues commensurate with their safety significance.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

During interviews with station personnel, the inspectors assessed the safety conscious work environment at Peach Bottom. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed personnel to determine whether they were hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management or the NRC. The inspectors also interviewed the station Employee Concerns Program coordinator to determine what actions are implemented to ensure employees were aware of the program and its availability with regards to raising safety concerns. The inspectors reviewed the Employee Concerns Program files to ensure that Exelon entered issues into the corrective action program when appropriate.

b. Assessment

During interviews, Peach Bottom staff expressed a willingness to use the corrective action program to identify plant issues and deficiencies and stated that they were willing to raise safety issues. The inspectors noted that no one interviewed stated that they personally experienced or were aware of a situation in which an individual had been retaliated against for raising a safety issue. All persons interviewed demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the corrective action program and the Employee Concerns Program. Based on these limited interviews, the inspectors concluded that there was not evidence of an unacceptable safety conscious work environment and there were not significant challenges to the free flow of information.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On May 23, 2013, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Patrick Navin, Plant Manager, and other members of the Peach Bottom staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

**ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION**

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION**

**KEY POINTS OF CONTACT**

Licensee Personnel

R. Arters, Chemistry Technician  
C. Bauer, RCIC System Manager  
R. Brightup, Air Operated Valve Program Manager  
D. Dullum, Licensing Engineer  
M. Flynn, Senior Maintenance Programs Specialist  
A. Fogarty, Chemistry Staff  
J. Fogarty, Outage Planner  
S. Griffith, Security Operations Manager  
M. Grim, Chemistry Technician  
J. Kelly, Employee Concerns Specialist  
J. Kovalchick, Site Security Manager  
R. Lack, System Engineer  
M. Long, Senior Engineering Manager  
D. McClellan, Senior Regulatory Engineer  
G. Mehrotra, Senior Electrical Engineer  
M. Miller, Employee Concerns Specialist  
J. Moore, Operations Outage Manager Assistant  
R. Moye, System Engineer  
J. Paxson, Chemistry Technician  
C. Reynolds, Motor Operated Valve Program Manager  
R. Shortes, Radiation Engineering Manager  
D. Turek, Shift Operations Superintendent  
D. Wheeler, Maintenance Rule Program Coordinator

**LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED**

Opened and Closed

None

**LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

**Section 40A2: Problem Identification and Resolution**

Audits and Self-Assessments

Maintenance Rad Worker Practices, (AR 1413766), March 10, 2013  
Radiation Protection Audit Report, NOSA-PEA-11-06 (AR 1238450), Peach Bottom, August 1 –  
16, 2011  
Chemistry, Radwaste, Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Increased Frequency Audit  
Report, Audit NOSA-PEA-11-12 (AR 1202556) Peach Bottom, May 2-6, 2011  
2013 NRC Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) Inspection; IP 71152, (AR 1440846),  
3/27/13

NOSA-PEA-11-08 (AR 1266947), Operations Audit Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station,  
 November 14 – December 1, 2011  
 Operational Decision-Making Check-In Self-Assessment, June 2012  
 Peach Bottom Safety Culture Survey Check in Self-Assessment, November 2010  
 2011 Employee Concerns Program Check-In Self-Assessment, January 18, 2012  
 2012 Employee Concerns Program Check-In Self-Assessment, December 20, 2012  
 OPEX Biennial Check-In Self-Assessment, November 20, 2012  
 Quality of Level 3 OPEX Evaluations Check-In Self-Assessment, November 19, 2012  
 Annual 2011 Review of OPEX Evaluation Quality and Timeliness, December 1, 2011  
 NOS-PEA-11-03, Emergency Preparedness Audit Report  
 NOS-PEA-11-11, Maintenance Increased Frequency Audit Report  
 NOS-PEA-12-01, Maintenance Audit Report  
 NOS-PEA-10-03, Emergency Preparedness Audit Report  
 NOS-PEA-13-12, Maintenance Increased Frequency Audit Report  
 NOSCPA-PB-11-13, Maintenance CPA Report  
 NOSCAP-PB-12-15, Maintenance CPA Report  
 Self-Assessment: Effectiveness of Maintenance and Technical Training (M&TT) Self-  
 Assessment with a Focus on CAP (IR 1436074)  
 Self-Assessment: Maintenance Planning Department Adherence to Risk Assessment Process  
 (IR 1314763)

Condition Reports (\* indicates that condition report was generated as a result of this inspection)

1260163	1252395	1380126	1252615	1243718
1278595	1254179	1380127	1263661	1243711
1390376	1266600	1380128	1344626	1373124
1394841	1266604	1380129	1358879	1381509
1491605	1272124	1380131	1368694	1384019
1284657	1295990	1383337	1394300	1371526
1406856	1296150	1393050	1431162	1371478
1408782	1296400	1396023	1460745	1443538
1483142	1296403	1401183	1487149	1498912
1456669	1296494	1409837	1466119	1499393
1251816	1303054	1413333	1361089	1324825
1278595	1309636	1419073	1474240	1144138
1382220	1310491	1423042	1456334	1442380
1420050	1317988	1428597	1396262	1442381
1422879	1317995	1430391	1496901	1442375
1249884	1319764	1457767	1492813	1442377
1250326	1328306	1466222	1484821	1166967
1250333	1352158	1513561	1495833	807147
1262600	1355773	1513692	1394025	871864
1270436	1359061	1518729	1105303	938245
1302824	1364066	1199711	1440846	965437
892191	1371735	1359373	1333896	973979
895789	1377135	1414197	784415	1034965
898030	1380119	1351957	848390	1112339
901501	1380121	1383301	843641	1120122
986151	1380122	1423654	896717	1121119
1207242	1380124	1321142	1076488	1165407
1249919	1380125	1246183	1243219	1184333

1212082	1342458	1422294	1497484	*1511693
1244984	1353911	1425241	1497489	*1511775
1254395	1353913	1427419	1497495	*1511139
1262861	1356569	1436700	1497497	*1512510
1279042	1363032	1434493	1497502	*1511617
1286435	1364394	1442994	1497508	*1510670
1290922	1364396	1462374	1497527	*1513303
1293634	1364792	1465277	1497641	*1513407
1311040	1373999	1468996	1497695	*1516193
1314373	1377970	1473642	1497697	*1522740
1319322	1382061	1484821	1497713	
1321901	1394863	1489880	1500538	
1326777	1408784	1497451	1516661	
1340452	1412949	1497456	*1512643	

### Operating Experience

NRC Information Notice 2012-06, Ineffective Use of Vendor Technical Recommendations  
 1474240  
 1466119  
 1456334  
 1396262

Fairbanks Morse SIL 22, Fuel Oil Control Linkage, Revision 2

### Non-Cited Violations and Findings

05000277/2012003-01; 05000278/2012003-01, Inadequate Test Control to Demonstrate RCIC System Design Basis Start-up Response Time  
 05000278/2011005-01, Untimely Corrective Action to Correct MOV Degraded Stem Lubrication  
 05000277&278/2011403  
 05000277&278/2012404-02, Failure to Implement a Testing Program to Ensure Security Systems Performed Their Intended Functions  
 05000277&278/2011502-01, Changes Made to EAL HU6 Which Decreased the Effectiveness of the Plans Without Prior NRC Approval

### Drawings

M-1-S-54, Sheet 7, RPS Electrical Schematic Diagram, Revision 81  
 M-1-S-34, Sheet 78, PRNM Elementary Diagram, Revision 1

### Procedures

RT-H-099-960-2, Outside Radioactive Material Storage Area Inspection and Survey" Revision 9  
 RP-AA-500-100, Requirements for Radioactive Material Stored Outdoors, Revision 3  
 LS-AA-115, Operating Experience Program, Revision 17  
 LS-AA-115-1001, Processing of Level 1 OPEX Evaluations, Revision 5  
 LS-AA-115-1002, Processing of Level 2 OPEX Evaluations, Revision 3  
 LS-AA-115-1003, Processing of Level 3 OPEX Evaluations, Revision 2  
 LS-AA-115-1004, Processing of NERs, NNOEs, and Root Cause Report Transmittals to INPO, Revision 2

LS-AA-120, Issue Identification and Screening Process, Revision 14  
 LS-AA-125, Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure, Revision 17  
 LS-AA-125-1001, Root Cause Manual, Revision 10  
 LS-AA-125-1002, Common Cause Analysis Manual, Revision 7  
 LS-AA-125-1003, Apparent Cause Evaluation Manual, Revision 10  
 LS-AA-125-1004, Effectiveness Review Manual, Revision 5  
 LS-AA-125-1005, Coding and Analysis Manual, Revision 8  
 LS-AA-126, Self-Assessment and Benchmark (SAB) Program, Revision 7  
 LS-AA-126-1001, Focused Area Self-Assessments, Revision 7  
 LS-AA-126-1005, Check-In Self-Assessments, Revision 5  
 NO-AA-10, Quality Assurance Topical Report, Revision 87  
 NO-AA-50, Nuclear Oversight Vendor Audit (NOVA) Process Description, Revision 0  
 NO-AA-210, Nuclear Oversight Regulatory Audit Procedure, Revision 3  
 NO-AA-210-1001, Nuclear Oversight Audit Handbook, Revision 5  
 NO-AA-210-1002, Nuclear Oversight Audit Templates, Revision 3  
 NO-AA-220, Nuclear Oversight Performance Assessment Procedure, Revision 7  
 NO-AA-220-1004, Nuclear Oversight Comprehensive Performance Assessment Rating and Reporting, Revision 11  
 NO-AA-300, Inspection Planning and Execution of Quality Inspection Activities, Revision 4  
 OP-AA-108-115, Operability Determinations (CM-1), Revision 11  
 OP-PB-108-115-1002, Operability Determination Management Guidance, Revision 0  
 OP-AA-108-115-1002, Supplemental Consideration for On-Shift Immediate Operability Determinations, Revision 2  
 WC-AA-101, On-Line Work Control Process, Revision 19  
 WC-AA-101-1002, On-Line Scheduling Process, Revision 11  
 EI-AA-101, Employee Concerns Program, Revision 10  
 EI-AA-101-1001, Employee Concerns Program Process, Revision 11  
 EI-AA-101-1002, Employee Issues Trending, Revision 7  
 ER-AA-302-1004, Motor Operated Valve Performance Trending, Revision 8  
 ER-AA-302-1006, Motor-Operated Valve Maintenance and Testing Guidelines, Revision 12  
 ER-AA-310, Implementation of the Maintenance Rule, Revision 8  
 ER-AA-310-1002, Maintenance Rule Functions – Safety Significance Classification, Revision 3  
 ER-AA-310-1003, Maintenance Rule – Performance Criteria Selection, Revision 3  
 ER-AA-310-1004, Maintenance Rule – Performance Monitoring, Revision 11  
 ER-AA-310-1005, Maintenance Rule – Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2), Revision 6  
 ER-AA-310-1006, Maintenance Rule – Expert Panel Roles and Responsibilities, Revision 4  
 ER-AA-310-1007, Maintenance Rule – Periodic (a)(3) Assessment, Revision 4  
 MA-AA-723-301, Periodic Inspection of Limitorque Model SMB/SB/SBD-000 through 5 Motor Operated Valves, Revision 8  
 RT-O-013-725-2, RCIC Response Time Test, Revision 11  
 ST-O-013-301-2, RCIC Pump, Valve, Flow, and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test, Revision 41  
 T-200C-3, Containment Venting via the 6-Inch ILRT Line from the Torus, Revision 9  
 T-200F-2, Containment Venting via the 6-Inch ILRT Line from the Drywell, Revision 5  
 WC-AA-106, Work Screening and Processing, Revision 13  
 EP-AA-1007, Exelon Nuclear Radiological Emergency Planning Annex for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Revision 26  
 OP-AA-108-117, Protected Equipment Program, Revision 3  
 RP-AA-460-003, Access to HRAS/LHRAS/VHRAS and Contaminated Areas in Response to a Potential or Actual Emergency, Revision 3

RT-S-045-911-2, Performance Test of E-Field, Microwave, Absolute and Shaker Detection Equipment, Revisions 19 ad 20

Work Orders

A0145774	A1748919	A1895506	R0760312
A1684106	A1858476	C0246720	

Miscellaneous

Level 3 OPEX Evaluation Process Changes Briefing Slides for End-Users  
 List of valves still awaiting conversion to MOV long-life grease (May 10, 2013)  
 (a)(1) Action Plan for Unit 2 and 3 Core Spray Minimum Flow Valve Differential Pressure Switches, dated January 31, 2012  
 (a)(1) Determination for Unit 2 and 3 Core Spray System Pump Differential Pressure Switches, dated November 9, 2011  
 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 24 (Sections 4.7.3 and 14.5.4.4)  
 NRC Information Notice 2012-06, Ineffective Use of Vendor Technical Recommendations  
 Level 3 OPEX Evaluation Process Changes Briefing Slides for End-Users  
 Maintenance Rule Basis Information from Maintenance Rule Database for System 55E  
 Safety Culture OR Survey, January 12, 2012  
 Semi-Annual Safety Culture Reviews, 1Q2012, 2Q2012, 3Q2012, 4Q2012  
 Peach Bottom Safety Culture Monitoring Panel, 4Q2012  
 Employee Feedback Survey, June 2011  
 NRC Inspection Report 05000277&8/2012-005  
 NSMART Perimeter Intrusion Detection System Performance Routine Test Data, 12/09/2012 and 01/23/2013  
 Regulatory Guide 5.44, Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Systems, Revision 3  
 Unified Control Room Log keyword searches, 05/20/08 to 05/20/13

**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

ADAMS	Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System
CAPR	Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
kV	kilovolts
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PARS	Publicly Available Records System
Vdc	Volts – direct current